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Broker's Agency Disclosure Law: Misinformation or Disinformation? 
by Roger Bernhardt 
July 1988 
 
Starting this year, the sellers of a one-to-four-family residential 
building received from their broker a new form which described three 
possible agency relationships they could have with their broker. This form 
should have been given to them before they were allowed to sign a listing on 
their building. A similar experience happened to the buyer: Once she showed 
more than passing interest in the property, her broker gave her the same 
form before letting her make an offer. When the two brokers presented the 
offer to the sellers, the buyer's broker gave another copy of this same form 
to them, before presenting them with her offer. (To avoid confusion, this 
article employs the following linguistic conventions for the parties: Each 
broker is a male ("he"); the buyer is a female ("she"); and the sellers are a 
married couple ("they").) 
 
These events are the result of the Broker's Agency Disclosure Law (CC 
§§2373-2382), which took effect January I, 1988. It is a law that probably 
creates more problems than it solves. This article describes how the law 
works, points out the questions and problems it raises, and concludes that 
the law probably does little, if anything, to enhance the position of the 
consumers it was intended to protect. 
 
Summary of the Law 
 
The law creates broker disclosure requirements for transactions 
involving (1) the purchase and sale of property improved with one to four 
dwelling units, (2) a lease of such property for more than one year, and (3) 
mobile homes. Under CC §2374, listing and selling brokers must provide to 
buyers and sellers a disclosure statement that describes the kinds of agency 
relationship a broker may have in a transaction (seller's agent, buyer's 
agent, or dual agent) and the duties that arise on the part of the broker in 
each relationship. The statement must be in the form prescribed by CC 
§2375, and, in most situations, must be given to the buyer or seller "as soon 
as practicable." When an agency relationship with a specific client has been 
selected (apparently by the broker, as discussed below), this election must 
be disclosed to both buyer and seller "as soon as practicable" and confirmed 
in writing either in the purchase and sale contract or in a separate writing. 
 
The Disclosure Transactions 
 
The document given to the clients lists three possible agency 
relationships; it docs not state which relationship actually will arise between 
broker and sellers or buyer. Disclosure of that fact may occur later, 
conceivably as late as the final signing of the sales contract. Because 
delivering the document and disclosing the agency relationship chosen may 
be different events, five steps could occur in a normal transaction: (1) The 
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first broker hands a disclosure form to the sellers (and gets their listing); (2) 
he selects an agency relationship and informs them of it; (3) the second 
broker hands a disclosure form to the buyer; (4) he gets her offer and 
informs her of the agency relationship he has selected; (5) he hands another 
copy of the form to the sellers, presents her offer to them, and informs them 
of the agency relationship he has with the buyer. (This order could vary; No. 




The first broker described above is the "listing agent," i.e., the one 
who has taken the listing from the sellers. CC §2373(f). The second broker is 
the "selling agent," i.e . the one who has found the buyer (or has found the 
property for the buyer). CC §2373(n). (Compare the definition of "selling 
agent" in CC § I086(g), an element of which is participation in a multiple 
listing service (MLS); participation in an MLS is not a prerequisite for §2373 
disclosure purposes.) 
 
"Buyer" includes not merely a person who offers to purchase but also 
anyone "who seeks the services of an agent in more than a casual, 
transitory, or preliminary manner, with the object of entering into a real 
property transaction." CC §2373(c). Thus, touring an open house will not get 
the buyer a disclosure form, but if she shows enough interest, she might get 
one before she leaves. This expanded definition was necessitated by the 
statutory requirement that she receive a disclosure form before making an 
offer. CC §2374(d). 
 
The legislation creates important new categories covering the 
relationship of the listing and selling agents with the sellers and buyer. A 
broker can be a "seller's agent," a "buyer's agent," or a "dual agent." See CC 
§2375. (This nomenclature is sure to generate confusion, especially when the 
"selling agent" elects to be the "buyer's agent" rather than the "seller's 
agent." It is unfortunate that the "selling agent" was not designated the 
"showing agent" instead.) Substantive differences between the forms of 
agency are discussed below. 
 
Timing: When Is the Choice of Agency Disclosed? 
 
Requiring early disclosure of possible agency relationships but allowing 
deferred disclosure of the actual agency relationship selected is certain to 
cause trouble. 
 
1. Listing Agent's Disclosure to Sellers 
 
The sellers are informed at the outset that the listing agent can be 
either their exclusive agent or a dual agent; he may not act as the buyer's 
exclusive agent (CC §2375.5(b)). However, they might not learn until after 
they have signed the listing (or later) what kind of agent they have working 
for them. 
 
Assume that the broker tells the sellers that he has chosen to be a 
dual agent after they have signed the listing. Can they object? Can they tell 
him that they want him to be their exclusive agent instead? The legislation 
seems to make it strictly the broker's choice. Civil Code §2375.5 provides 
that the broker shall "disclose" the choice made "as soon as practicable," and 
§2378 provides for his "selecting as a condition of [his] employment, a 
specific form of agency relationship." This language certainly suggests that 
the broker alone makes the choice. On the other hand, §2375.5 also provides 
that the choice be "confirmed" by the sellers in writing, which implies 
agreement on the part of the sellers. Also, the preamble of the disclosure 
form states as follows: "When you enter into a discussion with a real estate 
agent regarding a real estate transaction, you should from the outset 
understand what type of agency relationship or representation you wish to 
have with the agent in the transaction. [Emphasis added.]" That statement 
should make the sellers think they have some say in the matter. 
 
A fundamental problem with the disclosure statement is that it does 
not tell the client who makes the agency choice. Given the language quoted 
above from the preamble, reasonable sellers (or buyers) could easily 
conclude that the choice is theirs and can be made later. Sellers who draw 
this conclusion would feel no need to resolve the agency issue before signing 
a listing agreement.  
 
The California Association of Realtors (CAR), which sponsored the bill, 
believes that the choice is the broker's. It has stated that "[o]ne of the most 
important benefits of the agency disclosure legislation is that it preserves the 
agent's right to choose the agency relationship that best suits the agent's 
business." California Association of Realtors Legal Department, Agency 
Legislation Compliance Manual p 6, Answer 7 (1987). CAR acknowledges that 
"[l]icensees still need to discuss with their clients and customers which 
agency will be used in their particular relationship" (p 28, Answer 32), but at 
the same time it recommends an office policy of agency representation "that 
can only be varied with the employing broker's written approval" (p 29, 
Answer 34). A policy of that kind leaves little to discuss except for a one-way 
explanation of what the broker's choice means (another source of problems, 
discussed below).  
 
Suppose that the broker does not explain to the sellers at the time he 
gets their listing that he will be the one choosing the relationship. Explaining 
to them what the relationships mean is not the same as informing them of 
where the choice lies or that it has already been made. The statute requires 
that the listing agent disclose the agency choice "as soon as practicable" (CC 
§2375.5(b)), which should mean before getting the listing if the broker has a 
settled office policy, as CAR suggests. It is likely that the sellers can rescind 
for fraud under CC § 1689(b)(1) if the listing broker gave them the general 
disclosure form without disclosing that the critical choice under it had already 
been made. 
 
If further contact occurred between the broker and the sellers before 
the broker disclosed his choice (e.g., an offer was received and discussed), 
and the sellers imparted confidential information to him or relied on his 
advice as to their negotiating position, his failure to disclose the intended 
dual agency could get him in even more trouble. In most instances, the 
listing agent's choice of dual agency will probably be disclosed in the offer. 
(CAR has revised its standard form Real Estate Purchase Contract and 
Receipt for Deposit to include a section that discloses the agency status of 
both listing agent and selling agent. See Compliance Manual pp 15-18.) As a 
practical matter, however, many sellers will not read this document closely 
until they are ready to sign the acceptance or make a counteroffer—i.e., after 
they have discussed the offer and their negotiating position with the broker. 
 
In such circumstances, what are the sellers' remedies? May they 
rescind the listing agreement under CC§ I 689(b)(2) (partial failure of 
consideration) or CC § I 689(b)(6) (the public interest will be prejudiced by 
allowing the contract to stand)? May they accept an offer but refuse to pay 
the commission because of their unhappiness with the broker's choice? (A 
principal may recover a commission paid to a broker for a willful breach of 
fiduciary duty. Menzel v Salka (1960) 179 CA2d 612, 4 CR 78. See California 
Real Property Sales Transactions §2.106 (Cal CEB 1981).) The agency 
disclosure law is absolutely silent about the consequences of nondisclosure. 
It will be hard for the broker to argue that the sellers should have expressed 
their displeasure sooner when the very problem arose because of his own 
tardiness in disclosing the fact which troubled them. What else could they 
have done if they were not told the broker was a dual agent until after they 
had been persuaded to accept the offer? Revocation of the listing may be the 
least of the broker's problems; his license may be revoked for acting as a 
dual agent without the prior knowledge and consent of both parties. Bus & P 
C § 10176(d). 
 
2. Disclosure to the Buyer 
 
Equally severe problems can arise between the selling agent and the 
buyer. She may be quite distressed to discover that the person who allayed 
her private fears about the property and who persuaded her to make the 
offer was acting all along as the sellers' agent (or a dual agent), rather than 
as her exclusive agent. Like the listing agent, he is required to make his 
election and disclosure "as soon as practicable." His foreknowledge will often 
be easier to establish. If this is an "in-house" sale and the listing agent had 
previously made an agency election, the selling agent's status is already 
determined; the statute does not permit associate licensees to hold different 
agency relationships. CC §2373(b). He knew (or should have known) from 
the start what sort of agency relationship he would have to have with the 
buyer. Disclosure "as soon as practicable" should mean when he discussed 
with the buyer the offer she would make. The same would be true for 
multiple listings, if the broker has a policy of accepting the offer of subagency 
extended through MLS. 
 
If the selling agent is automatically an agent of the listing agent under 
a house policy, then delivering a form to the buyer which falsely insinuates 
that status is an open question and discussing the pros and cons of various 
bargaining strategies with her before telling her of his true status may be 
actionable deceit. But what may she do about it? She may refuse to make an 
offer, but that penalizes her more than the broker. She owes no commission 
that she can subsequently refuse to pay. A complaint to the Real Estate 
Commissioner may be her only resort. 
 
3. Selling Agent's Disclosures to Sellers 
 
As noted above, CAR's revised offer form includes a section that 
confirms the agency designation for both listing agent and selling agent. It 
has advised its members as follows: "Since the agency confirmation clause in 
the body of an offer is a term of the agreement ..., modification of the clause 
will generally result in a counteroffer" (Compliance Manual p 9, Answer 26). 
"A seller can refuse to accept an offer based on the agency selected by the 
selling agent. If this occurs, the seller may wish to counter the buyer's offer, 
specifying the agency relationship the seller would find acceptable, and the 
buyer and the selling agent can modify their agency relationship 
accordingly....Otherwise, this is a term of an offer which must be negotiated" 
(p 9, Answer 27). 
 
If the sellers' objection is that the selling agent has elected to act as 
the buyer's agent or a dual agent, and they demand that he act as their 
exclusive agent, can matters be undone? Presumably, he has already 
rendered services to the buyer and elicited information from her as her 
agent. Can he withdraw as her agent without prejudicing her interests? Can 
the sellers trust the advice he has already given them about the offer, 
knowing that he also acted as agent for the buyer in preparing the offeI1 Are 
they willing to risk losing the offer by objecting to the agency selection? If 
the selling agent chose dual agency, are they willing to have the commission 
they must pay split with a broker who also represented the buyer? 
 
The scenarios described above reveal a fundamental flaw of the 
statutory scheme, i.e., its failure to recognize that brokers may owe clients 
duties even before they determine their status. For example, an agency 
relationship is created at the moment the sellers give the broker a listing 
even though the statute allows the broker to determine his status later. The 
statute neither acknowledges this twilight zone between the time the listing 
is given and the time the broker elects his status, nor recognizes that rights 
and obligations arise the moment the listing was given and cannot be so 
easily ignored by the broker's subsequent election. Brokers may discover 
that their attempt to narrow their duties by appropriate choices has 
generated a broader set of pre-choice duties. The judicial admonition that 
there is a strong reason to find the broker to be an agent when he has 
caused harm (Skopp v Weaver (1976) 16 C3d 432, 440, 128 CR 19,24) will 
probably find full employment in cases arising under this new law. 
 
Distinctions or Doubletalk? 
 
Honorable brokers may have a harder time than dishonorable ones 
when they attempt to let their principals participate in the agency selection. 
If the selling agent intends to allow his buyer to decide what kind of agent 
she wants him be, he will have to explain the differences to her. (I choose 
the selling agent/buyer as an example because all three agency possibilities 
do exist in that situation. If the listing broker and sellers were involved, there 
would be no option of acting as the buyer's exclusive agent.) Will the buyer 
understand the following explanation (which paraphrases CC §2375)? 
 
"I can be your agent ('a buyer's agent'), the sellers' agent, or a dual 
agent. If I am your agent, I owe you fiduciary obligations of' utmost care, 
honesty, integrity and loyalty.' In addition, I owe both you and the seller 
general obligations of 'diligent exercise of reasonable skill and care,' 'honest 
and fair dealing and good faith,' and 'a duty to disclose all facts known [to 
me] materially affecting the value or desirability of the property' that you are 
not likely to know or discover. However, my loyalty to you is tempered by 
the fact that I am not obligated to reveal any confidential information which 
the sellers gave me which does not relate to any of these duties. 
 
"If I am the sellers' agent, then I do not owe you the fiduciary duties 
and, in fact, I will owe them to the sellers instead. I will still owe to you the 
general duties, however, and I am not obligated to reveal to the sellers any 
confidential information you give me. To elaborate, I will not owe you a duty 
of 'utmost care,' but only 'diligent exercise of reasonable skill and care' 
(which I must reconcile with my fiduciary duty of utmost care to the sellers). 
I will not owe you utmost honesty but only honest and fair dealing and good 
faith (to be reconciled with a duty of utmost honesty to the sellers). I will not 
owe you my integrity or loyalty although my freedom to be corrupt or 
disloyal to you may be limited by my duties of good faith and fair dealing 
(which, again, I must square with my duty of loyalty to the sellers). Finally, 
my duties of disclosure and nondisclosure of confidential information are the 
same whether I am your agent or their agent. 
 
"If I am a dual agent, then I again owe you all of the fiduciary duties I 
would owe as your agent, but I simultaneously owe them to the sellers as 
well. Not only do I owe both sides utmost care, integrity, and honesty, but 
loyalty as well. Additionally, I owe both sides the general duties of skill, care, 
good faith, fair dealing, etc. But I cannot disclose to you that the sellers will 
take less than their listing price, nor can I tell them that you will pay more 
than your offering price." 
 
As the example above illustrates, the explanation of gency 
relationships offers little more than contradictory clichés. Clients will not 
understand the distinctions. Brokers will hardly know how to behave 
according to the choice made, and their attorneys will not be able to tell 
them. When the brokers are sued by unhappy principals, judicial instructions 
will be unintelligible and jury verdicts are bound to be unpredictable. (CAR 
advises its members that "[s]pecific fiduciary duties include loyalty, 
obedience, disclosure, confidentiality, reasonable care and diligence, and 
accounting." Compliance Manual p 25, Answer 3. If CAR blurs the 
fiduciary/general duty distinction, why should anyone else do better?) 
 
This problem cannot be blamed solely on the statute. The root cause 
of the difficulty is that we continue to permit brokers to represent both sides 
at once (the "dual agency" problem, as it is called). No lawyer is foolish 
enough to believe that he or she can represent both adversaries in battle 
simultaneously, but brokers continue to believe that they can. The legislature 
has not prohibited dual agency, and in response the judiciary has imposed 
duties on brokers that conflict with their fiduciary duty to their principals. 
See, e.g., Easton v Strassburger (1984) 152 CA3d 90,199 CR 383 (7 CEB 
RPLR 93 (June 1984)). The brokerage industry has responded by seeking to 
clarify and limit those duties. But self-contradictory duties cannot be made 
comprehensible. No person can properly serve two masters, even when 
ordered to do so by statute. 
 
The legislature has compounded the dilemmas inherent in dual agency 
by using language that creates even more confusion. For example: 
 
• Civil Code §2375 states that "[a]n agent is not obligated 
to reveal to either party any confidential information obtained 
from the other party which docs not involve the 
affirmative duties set forth above." This creates two linguistic 
nightmares: (I) With regard to information not 
involving an affirmative duty, is the broker really free 
to reveal or not reveal at his pleasure, i.e., did the legislature 
really mean "not Obligated to reveal" rather than 
"obligated not to reveal"? (2) With regard to confidential 
information involving an affirmative duty, is there 
really an obligation to disclose, as the statute seems to 
require, once all the "nots" have been removed from the 
sentence? (Compare CC §2379, which prohibits disclosing 
a principal's willingness to move on price, and 
which states: "This section does not alter in any way the 
duty or responsibility of a dual agent to any principal 
with respect to confidential information other than 
price.") 
 
• The disclosure form (CC §2375) states that a seller's 
agent or a buyer's agent owes to his principal "[a] 
fiduciary duty of utmost care, integrity, honesty and 
loyalty in dealings with" the principal. I assume that "utmost" 
modifies all four fiduciary duties. When a broker 
acts as dual agent-i.e., seller's agent and buyer's 
agent-just how does he show utmost loyalty to adverse 
principals without being duplicitous? 
 
• The duty not to disclose that a seller will take a lower 
price or the buyer will pay more is technically imposed 
only on the dual agent. CC §2379. Is the single agent 
really free to divulge such price information? Disclosure 
of his own principal's willingness to concede would be 
a clear breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty; but disclosure  
of the other party's price position would be either lack of good faith 
and fair dealing or a wrongful revelation of confidential information 
under the statute. If silence about price is  
mandated in all cases, it is regrettable that the statute  
mentions only dual agencies. 
 
Does It Matter? 
 
A broker most commonly gets himself in trouble when he skims off the 
difference between seller's and buyer's prices, when he does not disclose to 
the buyer defects in the property sold, and when he does not disclose to the 
sellers that he is purchasing the property himself. How do the new agency 
rules affect the outcomes in those cases? 
 
1. Secret Profits 
 
A broker reaps an unlawful secret profit by inducing the sellers to sell 
at a lower price and the buyer to purchase at a higher price, pocketing the 
differential (and a commission). The wrongfulness of such conduct does not 
depend on whose agent he is; he may be liable to either side. Compare 
Blandy v Bowden (1932) 217 C 61, 16 P2d 993 (buyer's agent liable to buyer 
for fraud), with Ward v Taggart (1959) 51 C2d 736, 336 P2d 534 (broker 
posing as seller's agent liable to buyer for unjust enrichment). The theories 
of recovery are different, but the measure of damages in both situations 
works out the same. The general measure of liability for fraud is out-of-
pocket loss (CC §3343), except that a principal defrauded by her agent may 
recover her benefit-of-the-bargain loss (CC §3333). Walsh v Hooker & Fay 
(1963) 212 CA2d 450, 458, 28 CR 16,22. A buyer who has paid more than 
the sellers were asking may have no out-of-pocket loss (if the market value 
of the house matched what she paid) but she does have a benefit-of- the-
bargain loss equal to the excess over what the sellers would have accepted. 
She can thus always recover the spread from a broker who was her own 
agent or a dual agent. Walters v Marler (1978) 83 CA3d I, 147 CR 655. But 
even if he was not her agent at all (i.e., he was the sellers' exclusive agent), 
Ward's doctrine that he holds his secret profit as involuntary trustee for her 
produces the same recovery. Punitive damages are still available and the 
broker is still precluded from deducting his expenses from the award. 
 
The new law is not likely to change this outcome. It imposes on the 
broker a duty of utmost honesty toward one party and a general duty of 
honesty and fair dealing to the other in single agencies, and a duty of utmost 
honesty to both in dual agencies. Secret profits fall below either standard. 
(The secretly profiting broker might be liable to buyer and sellers at the same 
time. If both would have been willing to transact at $100,000, but he 
persuaded the sellers to accept $95,000 and the buyer to pay $105,000, the 
sellers might recover $10,000 from him, because they received $10,000 less 
than what the buyer paid, and the buyer might make has the same point in 
reverse. Neither side's argument refutes the other. If the question is phrased 
in terms of what damages the broker's fraud has caused, rather than how his 
secret profit should be allocated, he may thus be liable for $20,000. There is 
no special reason to limit a defrauder's liability to his profit.) 
 
2. Nondisclosure of Defects 
 
Buyers commonly sue brokers for not having told them about the 
property's defects-i.e., conditions or facts relating to the property which 
adversely affect its value. Sellers also sue for undisclosed problems with 
property taken in trade or taken as security for the unpaid balance of the 
price. See, e.g., Schoenberg v Romike Props. (1967) 251 CA2d 154,59 CR 
359. When the concealment is intentional, the theory is fraud; when 
unintentional, the theory is negligence.  
 
Intentional nondisclosure by a broker in California and most other 
jurisdictions constitutes fraud on the buyer, even if the broker was not her 
agent. Godfrey v Steinpress (1982) 128 CA3d 154, 180 CR 95 (5 CEB RPLR 
59 (Apr.1982)). The sellers would be liable to her if they had intentionally 
concealed facts materially affecting value, and so is a knowing broker, 
regardless of whose agent he was.  
 
Liability for negligent nondisclosure to the buyer generally invites a 
distinction between buyer's and seller's agents. In most jurisdictions, the 
broker owes a duty of careful disclosure to the buyer only if he is her agent. 
Under such a rule, a selling agent's election to act exclusively as the sellers' 
agent could significantly reduce his responsibilities toward the buyer. In 
California, however, Easton v Strassburger (1984) 152 CA3d 90, 199 CR 383 
(7 CEB RPLR 93 (June 1982)), imposes on the broker a duty of care to the 
buyer, regardless of whose agent he is. Civil Code §§2079-2079.5, which 
partially codify Easton, do not change this duty. Section 2079 provides that 
"[i]t is the duty of a real estate broker ... to a prospective purchaser of 
residential real property comprising one to four dwelling units ... to conduct a 
reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered 
for sale and to disclose to that prospective purchaser all facts materially 
affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an investigation 
would reveal if that broker has a written contract with the seller to find or 
obtain a buyer or is a broker who acts in cooperation with such a broker to 
find and obtain a buyer." One need not be a buyer's agent to owe this duty 
to her. The standard of care owed by the broker is that of a "reasonably 
prudent" broker. It is "measured by the degree of knowledge through 
education, experience, and examination, required to obtain a license" (CC 
§2079.2), but not by the nature of the agency relationship. 
 
The new disclosure requirements for transfers of residential property 
(CC §§ 1102-1102.14) cover all brokers, regardless of whose agents they 
are. The statutory form (§ 1102.6) has one paragraph for inspection 
disclosure by the "broker representing seller" to be completed "only if the 
seller is represented by an agent," and another paragraph for inspection 
disclosure by the "broker obtaining the offer" to be completed "if the agent 
who has obtained the offer is other than the agent above." Thus both the 
sellers' agent and the buyer's agent must fill out the form (and make the 
inspection). A dual agent would surely have the same obligation. 
 
None of this is changed by the new agency disclosure law. As for 
intentional nondisclosure, the broker has a duty "to disclose all facts known 
to the agent materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that 
are not known to, or within the diligent attention and observation of, the 
parties." CC §2375. This is a general duty, not a fiduciary one, and is 
therefore owed by the broker to the buyer whether he is her agent or the 
sellers' agent (or a dual agent). (The language also includes those cases in 
which the broker actually knew of the defect and inadvertently failed to 
inform the buyer of it (negligent nondisclosure rather than simple 
negligence). The Easton duty to inspect and disclose defects found certainly 
includes the duty to disclose defects already known apart from an 
inspection.) 
 
As for negligence, the law provides that "[n]othing in this article shall 
be construed to either diminish the duty of disclosure owed buyers and 
sellers by agents...or to relieve agents...from liability for their conduct in 
connection with acts governed by this article or for any breach of a fiduciary 
duty or a duty of disclosure." CC §2382. This leaves the Easton rule intact; 
the injured buyer may recover from a broker for negligence, regardless of 
whether he was her agent, the sellers' agent, or a dual agent. (Whether she 
could also recover from the sellers and a listing broker who was their 
exclusive agent for any fraud or negligence committed by the selling agent 
might depend on that broker's relationship to the sellers. If he had elected to 
be their agent or a dual agent, they may be liable for his wrongs under the 
principle of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Ach v Finkelstein (1968) 264 
CA2d 667, 70 CR 472 (sellers' agent); Johnston v Seargeants (1952) 152 
CA2d 180,313 P2d 41 (cooperating broker). But it is considerably more 
difficult to make the sellers responsible to the buyer for the negligence of 
someone who was her agent rather than theirs. Correlatively, the sellers' 
rights of indemnity may be affected by the relationship they had to the 
selling broker (i.e., was he their agent exclusively or a dual agent?). See, 




In all jurisdictions a broker is prohibited from acquiring his principal's 
property for his own account without at least first disclosing his involvement. 
This prohibition is taken so seriously that the principal may recover against 
the broker for failing to disclose his involvement even if the price was fair. 
See, e.g., Bate v Marsteller(1959) 175 CA2d 573,583, 346 P2d 903, 909. But 
the bar does not apply to his purchasing land from someone who has not 
employed him as an agent. See, e.g., Caro v Savage (1962) 201 CA2d 
530,543,20 CR 286, 294. Being licensed as a broker does not prohibit one 
from buying and selling for his own account; it is only when he becomes 
agent for someone else that his dealings for his own account are restricted. 
Abell v Watson (1957) 155 CA2d 158, 317 P2d 159. (The same is true for a 
broker selling his own property; he may do so freely as long as he is not the 
agent of the buyer. Anderson v Thacher (1946) 76 CA2d 50, 65,172 P2d 533, 
541. As sellers' agent, the broker might be liable to the sellers for wrongfully 
competing with them, but that situation is much less common and raises 
entirely different issues.) The rule against self-dealing is not, therefore, a 
"general" duty; it is strictly fiduciary, being owed only by one who is agent 
for another. 
 
Consequently, agency status will matter on this point. When the selling 
agent has elected to be the buyer's exclusive agent, the sellers may not be 
able to complain if he subsequently involves himself with the buyer without 
telling them (e.g., if he loans his commission to the buyer to help her pay the 
price (see Zisswasser v Cole & Cowan, Inc. (1985) 164 CA3d 417, 210 CR 
428), or simply goes in on the purchase with her or instead of her). Were he 
a dual agent or the sellers' exclusive agent, such activity would be 
automatically punishable, i.e., he would lose his commission, his title to the 
property, his license, or all of these. 
 
Of course, if it does make some difference what kind of agent the 
broker is, we will then need to determine how that affects what he must tell 
each principal (before he makes an election) about his potential freedom 
(after he makes an election) not to tell them about his own activities if he 
elects to work for the other side. There is no end to the unanswered 
questions this law can generate! 
